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Abstract. In this article we present the use of sparse representation of a signal
and incoherent dictionary learning method for the purpose of network traffic
analysis. In learning process we use 1D INK-SVD algorithm to detect proper
dictionary structure. Anomaly detection is realized by parameter estimation
of the analyzed signal and its comparative analysis to network traffic profiles.
Efficiency of our method is examined with the use of extended set of test traces
from real network traffic. Received experimental results confirm effectiveness of
the presented method.
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1. Introduction
Dynamic and continuous development of local and global information systems re-
quires proper protection against cybercriminal attacks. In their attempts, they apply
more and more excellent techniques of penetration and hacking infrastructures of net-
work systems. Most often, it is realised by dynamically spreading network malware.
Growing threat and universality of using information resources stimulate ongoing de-
velopment of safety and protection network systems [1]. Essential mechanisms of
safety supervision over computer networks are Intrusion Detection/Prevention Sys-
tems (IDS/IPS). Their action consists in monitoring and detecting attacks directed
onto resources of computer systems. The main aim of IDS systems is detecting success-
ful attacks. However, they are also applied in monitoring and registering of attempts
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to break securities of an attacked computer system [2, 3]. IDS intrusion detection
systems can be classified as belonging to one of two groups using diverse techniques
of threat identification. One is based on detection of known attacks with the use of
defined and specific features, named signatures. The other uses the idea of monitoring
normal work of a given system in order to detect anomalies that may be indicative
of an intruder. It allows for detecting attempts of intrusion consisting of numerous
network connections [4]. Primary advantage of methods based on anomaly detection
is their ability to indicate unknown attacks. The above mentioned approach uses
knowledge of not how a particular attack looks like, but what does not correspond
to specified network traffic norms. Therefore, IDS/IPS systems based on the use of
anomalies are more effective in comparison with systems applying signatures while
detecting unknown, new types of attacks. In this article we present the use of incoher-
ent dictionary learning method and sparse representation of a signal for specific time
series describing the analysed network traffic. Anomaly detection is realized by esti-
mated parameters of the sparse representation of a signal and comparative analysis
to network traffic profiles [5]. This paper is organized as follows: after the introduc-
tion, in Section 2, the sparse representation of a signal for date traffic prediction is
described in details. Then, in Section 3 the incoherent dictionary learning method
based on 1D INK-SVD algorithm estimation is shown. Implementation details and
experimental results are described in Section 4. Conclusions are given thereafter.
2. Sparse representation of a signal
The difficulty of locating the sparse representation of a signal in a specific overcomplete
dictionary might be described in the following way: sparse representation is searching
for the sparse explanation of decomposition coefficients C, standing for the signal S,
over the redundant dictionary, where the balance is smaller than a given constant T ,
and it can be presented as:
min ‖c‖0 subject to
∥∥∥∥S −∑K−1k=0 ckdk
∥∥∥∥ < ε, (1)
where ‖·‖0 is the l0 norm figuring up the nonzero items of a vector, ck ∈ C representing
a set of projection coefficients and dk are the elements of the redundant dictionary
D. It is difficult to obtain the outcome of the equation (1) because of its specification
of combinational optimization. We can find the best possible solutions to the issues
by iterative methods, e.g. the matching pursuit algorithm, as well as the orthogonal
pursuit algorithm. The matching pursuit (MP) algorithm is proposed in [6]. The goal
of the above mentioned is to approximate to the input signal S by sequential choice
of vectors from the dictionary D. The algorithm proceeds greedy tactics in which the
basis vector best aligned with the residual vector is selected at each iteration. Signal
S can be noted down as the weighted sum of these items
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S =
∑n−1
i=0
cidi + r
ns, (2)
where rns is residual in an n-term total. The orthogonal matching pursuit (OMP)
algorithm is an upgrade of MP algorithm and is presented in [7, 6]. Resemblance
between two algorithms has a greedy structure, however, what concerns discrepancies
is that OMP algorithm requires selected atoms to be orthogonal in each decomposition
stage. The algorithm chooses ϕp in the p
th iteration by spotting the vector best
aligned with the residual gained by projecting rps onto the dictionary elements, that
is
ϕp = arg maxi∈Φp |〈rps, di〉| , ϕp /∈ Φp−1 (3)
and
cp =
〈
rp−1s, dϕp
〉
, (4)
where Φp = {ϕ1, ϕ2, ..., ϕp−1, ϕp} is the index vector and Dp = {dϕ1 , dϕ2 , ..., dϕp} is
the columns of the dictionary Dp. The initial set of value is Φ0 = ∅ and D0 = ∅.
The complication with the re-selection is to be omitted with the stored dictionary. If
ϕp /∈ ϕp−1 then the index set is updated as Φp = Φp−1 ∪ ϕp and Dp = Dp−1 ∪ dϕp .
In other case, Φp = Φp−1 and Dp = Dp−1. The residual rps is calculated as
rps = rp−1s−Dp
(
DTpDp
)−1
DTp r
p−1s, (5)
where DTpDp is the Gram matrix. The algorithm concludes when residual of a signal
is smaller than adequate limit
‖rps‖ < th, (6)
where th is the approximation error.
The final complication of OMP can be diminished by using the Cholesky Fac-
torization, the QR Factorization, or the Matrix Inversion Lemma [8, 9, 10]. In our
practical realization we use a progressive Cholesky upgrade process to diminish the
effort connected with the matrix inversion.
3. Dictionary learning
A dictionary learning problem for sparse approximation is finding the best dictionary
D to represent the signal S as sparse composition, by solving
minD,C
{
‖S −DC‖2F
}
subject to ∀i ‖ci‖ 0 ≤ T, (7)
where ‖·‖2F is the Frobenius norm and T is a fixed and predetermined number of
nonzero entries. The commonly applied strategy to solve this problem is to start with
an initial dictionary and alternate between the fallowing steps: sparse approximation
and dictionary update [11].
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3.1. The 1D K-SVD algorithm for search dictionary of signal
Many dictionary learning algorithms follow an iterative solution that alternates be-
tween update of D and C to minimize the cost function 7. In our work we use the
1D K-SVD algorithm. This solution is efficient for adapting dictionaries in order to
achieve sparse signal representations [12].
The algorithm iterates in two steps:
The Sparse Approximation Step: Provided D is fixed. We use the orthogonal
matching pursuit algorithm (mentioned in section 2) to estimate M sparse coefficients
ci for each sample of signal S, by approximation of the solution of
minC
{
‖si −Dci‖2F
}
subject to ‖ci‖0 ≤ T, i = 1, 2, ...M, (8)
where si is a sample of signal S.
The Dictionary Update Step: Provided both C and D are fixed. We focus on an
atom dk of the dictionary and its corresponding sparse vector c
k
T (i.e. row k of c
k
T ),
the corresponding objective function in 7 can be written as:
‖S −DC‖2F =
∥∥∥∥S −∑Kj=1 djcjT
∥∥∥∥2
F
=
=
∥∥∥(S −∑
j 6=k djc
j
T
)
− dkckT
∥∥∥2
F
=
∥∥Ek − dkckT∥∥2F , (9)
where Ek indicates the representation error of the sample of signal after removing the
kth atom and its fixed. The next steps of the dictionary update stages are:
• Define the set of indexes that use the atom dk , which means the case ckT (i) is
non-zero as
ωk =
{
i|1 ≤ i ≤M, ckT (i) 6= 0
}
. (10)
• Define the matrix Ωk as a matrix with ones on the (ωk(i), i) − th entries and
zeros elsewhere.
• Then compute
Ek = S −
∑
j 6=k djc
j
T (11)
and restrict Ek by choosing the columns corresponding to ωk so that we obtain
ERk .
• Finally, apply SV D to decompose ERk = U∆V T and update dk to be first
column of U and coefficient vector ckT to be first column of V multiplied by
∆(1, 1).
All dictionary atoms are updated is this way. Iterating through the two steps
will produce dictionary that approximates given signal S sparsely and accurately.
A detailed description of the presented algorithm can be found in the work of [11, 12].
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3.2. An incoherent dictionary learning problem
The coherence µ(D) of a dictionary D measures the maximal correlation of different
atoms
µ (D) = maxdi,dj∈D i6=j
∣∣∣∣〈 di|di|2 , dj|dj |2
〉∣∣∣∣ , (12)
where µ is the function, and is valued between 0 and 1. The minimum is reached for
an orthogonal dictionary and the maximum µ0 for a dictionary containing at least
two collinear atoms. The general problem of the incoherent dictionary learning is to
find the closest dictionary D̂ to a given dictionary D¯, with a coherence lower than
a given µ0. The dictionary D¯ is described as
D̂ = arg minD∈Γ
∥∥D − D¯∥∥2
F
(13)
and
Γ = {D|µ (D) ≤ µ0 ∧ ‖di‖2 = 1, i ∈ {1, ...,M}} . (14)
A good strategy for this problem can be pursued by including a decorrelation step
to the iterative scheme in section 3.1. At each iteration of the dictionary learning
algorithm consisting of sparse approximation followed by dictionary update, we add
the following optimization problem
D̂ = arg minD∈Γ µ (D) (15)
and
Γ′ =
{
D|∥∥D − D¯∥∥2
F
≤ θ ∧ ‖di‖2 = 1, i ∈ {1, ...,M}
}
, (16)
where θ is the unknown minimum value reached by the criterion (13). In our imple-
mentation we solve the problem by inserting a decorrelation step in the K-SVD loop
after the dictionary update. The modified algorithm is called the Incoherent – KSVD
INK-KSVD. For more information about this algorithm, please see [13].
4. Experimental results
In this section we compare results achieved for INK-KSVD and KSVD based anomaly
detection to SNORT [14] based preprocessor which we proposed in [3]. Preprocessor
uses DWT – Discrete Wavelet Transform (Mallat implementation [6, 15]) for anomaly
detection.
Efficiency of INK -KSVD based anomaly detection algorithm was evaluated by
simulating different real world attacks on test LAN network. We used Kali Linux [16]
distribution in order to simulate different attacks such as: Application specific DDos,
various port scanning, DoS, DDoS, Syn Flooding, pocket fragmentation, spoofing and
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Table 1. Network traffic features used for experiments.
Feature Traffic feature description
f1 number of TCP packets
f2 in TCP packets
f3 out TCP packets
f4 number of TCP packets in LAN
f5 number of UDP datagrams
f6 in UDP datagrams
f7 out UDP datagrams
f8 number of UDP datagrams
in LAN
f9 number of ICMP packets
f10 out ICMP packets
f11 in ICMP packets
f12 number of ICMP packets in LAN
f13 number of TCP packets with
SYN and ACK flags
Feature Traffic feature description
f14 out TCP packets (port 80)
f15 in TCP packets (port 80)
f16 out UDP datagrams (port 53)
f17 in UDP datagrams (port 53)
f18 out IP traffic [kB/s]
f19 in IP traffic [kB/s]
f20 out TCP traffic (port 80) [kB/s]
f21 in TCP traffic (port 80) [kB/s]
f22 out UDP traffic [kB/s]
f23 in UDP traffic [kB/s]
f24 out UDP traffic (port 53) [kB/s]
f25 in UDP traffic (port 53) [kB/s]
others. We used the same set of attacks as in [3] in order to compare INK-KSVD
based solution to algorithms based on KSVD and DWT [3]. In order to classify
anomalies we create profiles of normal traffic behavior based on network traffic features
with assumption that there is no attack in this traffic. For algorithms evaluation 25
traffic features was extracted from network traffic (see Table 1). Traffic features
are represented as one dimensional – 1D vector of values. In Tables 2 and 3 there
are results of DR detection rates and FP false positive, respectively. We can see
that for a given test, INK-KSVD give us better results in comparison to KSVD and
DWT based anomaly detection methods. We can notice that detection rate and false
positive strongly depend on given traffic feature. Attack has got direct impact only
on selected traffic features from Table 1. f9 and f10 features give us the best results.
DR [%] for f9 and f10 changes in boundaries 90.73− 98.43 in turn FP [%] changes in
boundaries 0.32− 5.12.
Additionally, we tested our method with basic traffic base [17] for evaluating
algorithm performance. In Table 4 there are results of detection rate for two testing
days.
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Table 2. Detection Rate DR [%] for a given network traffic features.
Feature KSVD INK-KSVD Mallat
f1 5.26 8.26 5.26
f2 5.26 12.52 10.52
f3 0.00 12.52 10.52
f4 15.78 10.52 10.52
f5 10.52 14.52 10.52
f6 0.00 0.00 0.00
f7 0.00 0.00 0.00
f8 25.22 35.24 31.58
f9 90.73 98.43 94.73
f10 83.68 96.43 94.73
f11 7.24 10.26 5.26
f12 80.42 85.95 78.95
f13 10.52 14.22 10.52
Feature KSVD INK-KSVD Mallat
f14 0.00 8.26 5.26
f15 0.00 14.22 10.52
f16 0.00 0.00 0.00
f17 5.26 8.26 5.26
f18 10.52 14.52 10.52
f19 5.26 8.22 5.26
f20 10.52 15.24 5.26
f21 12.26 14.24 10.52
f22 0.00 0.00 0.00
f23 0.00 0.00 0.00
f24 0.00 0.00 0.00
f25 5.26 8.24 0.00
Table 3. False Positive FP [%] for a given network traffic features.
Feature KSVD INK-KSVD Mallat
f1 5.46 4.23 7.43
f2 5.17 4.84 7.99
f3 5.45 4.22 7.96
f4 5.44 4.02 6.06
f5 5.64 4.23 5.62
f6 3.96 3.02 4.14
f7 5.18 3.50 5.33
f8 5.24 4.24 8.28
f9 7.68 6.12 9.13
f10 1.22 0.32 0.48
f11 5.12 4.12 12.06
f12 6.34 4.20 4.34
f13 5.23 4.56 7.07
Feature KSVD INK-KSVD Mallat
f14 4.58 3.26 7.48
f15 4.86 3.52 7.17
f16 0.02 0.02 0.02
f17 0.40 0.25 0.39
f18 4.80 3.72 8.74
f19 5.24 4.46 8.36
f20 4.52 3.18 8.50
f21 4.23 3.12 7.09
f22 3.46 2.52 3.08
f23 4.82 2.82 3.07
f24 0.02 0.00 0.00
f25 0.37 0.03 0.02
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Table 4. Detection Rate for W5D5 (Week5, Day5) and W5D1 DARPA [17] trace.
Network Traffic DR[%] DR[%] DR[%] DR[%]
Feature KSVD INK-KSVD KSVD INK-KSVD
W5D5 W5D5 W5D1 W5D1
icmp flows/min. 64.7 95.60 94.52 95.42
icmp in bytes/min. 79.14 92.22 93.15 98.42
icmp in frames/min. 85.29 94.28 93.15 94.82
icmp out bytes/min. 79.41 85.25 89.04 98.12
icmp out frames/min. 88.23 94.85 75.34 94.22
tcp flows/min. 48.52 85.28 63.01 98.63
tcp in bytes/min. 55.88 92.64 90.41 94.25
tcp in frames/min. 60.29 90.72 97.26 98.54
tcp out bytes/min. 36.76 94.25 84.93 96.54
tcp out frames/min. 38.23 85.24 89.04 96.54
udp flows/min. 85.29 98.25 90.41 96.64
udp in bytes/min. 76.47 100.00 87.67 98.82
udp in frames/min. 85.29 98.75 68.49 100.00
udp out bytes/min. 89.7 96.22 98.63 100.00
udp out frames/min. 91.17 100.00 98.63 100.00
5. Conclusions
In this article we describe the complete procedure of building sparse representation
of a signal and propose to identify anomalies based on network traffic prediction. In
learning processes we apply modified 1D INK-SVD algorithm to detect incoherent
dictionary on the basis of network traffic which does not contain anomalies. The
classification is performed with the use of normal network traffic profiles and sparse
representation parameters of the analyzed signal.The computed results clearly showed
that abnormal activities included in the traffic signal can be detected by the proposed
methods.
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